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Abstract 
We propose a formulation of the Network Design Problem (NDP) to support transport planners in dealing with multimodal 
networks in contexts characterised by different (and sometimes conflicting) interests and limited resources in a transparent way. 
We expect that the implementation of the method can increase the acceptability of transport schemes. 
The proposed formulation expands the scope of traditional NDP approaches: firstly, it takes public transit into account alongside 
private transport. Then, it considers the relevance of equity among other planning goals, enabling the achievement of solutions 
with a fair distribution of transport impacts (benefits and costs) among the users. Finally, it proposes the conjoint use of fuzzy 
and rigid goals and constraints to improve the quality of the solutions. 
Equity is defined as the mode-specific relative variation of the overall mobility between Origin-Destination (OD) pairs. We 
propose two specifications of the equitable NDP: one uses a crisp approach, with objective function equal to the overall network 
cost. The other is a fuzzy  maximisation of the level of satisfaction generated by a certain network configuration. The level of 
satisfaction depends on the extent at which a given solution achieves private and public transport equity and overall network cost 
targets. 
We illustrate the approach in the case of a signal time planning problem in a small network. The evaluation of the performance of 
crisp and fuzzy optimisation shows that the former approach provides better solutions to private transport and vice versa. We 
propose that, when using fuzzy optimisation, the decision maker should evaluate a set of nearly-optimal solutions selected on the 
basis of Pareto optimality. 
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
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1. Introduction 
Mobility is fundamental in any society. Advances in transportation shape the life of individuals and the 
organisation of societies, crucially affecting the development of civilizations. The increase of world population and 
the diffusion of western development models are generating a rise of demand for transportation. National and local 
governments must take decisions concerning transport networks in a careful way, above all in urban contexts, to 
grant mobility and, at the same time, reduce and mitigate mobility-related problems such as congestion, air pollution, 
noise, accidents, and segregation of vulnerable categories.  
Planning, design and control issues are traditionally addressed in NDP (Faharani et al., 2013). The objective of 
NDP is to determine the optimal allocation of (new) resources in a transportation network (Friesz, 1985). In this 
definition, the facilities may be represented by either nodes or links. In addition, since transportation includes both 
public and private transport, this problem can involve transit networks in addition to road networks in a multimodal 
framework (D’Acierno et al., 2011). 
One of the biggest challenges for transportation planning is to provide solutions in which some resources and/or 
impacts are distributed as evenly as possible among users. The difficulty of the task is partly due to the fact that costs 
and benefits can be quantified in different ways and that the equity of their distribution is subject to interpretation 
(Karner and Niemeier, 2013).  
In recent decades, transportation planners and policymakers have become increasingly concerned with equity and 
its application to the development of transportation systems (Bertolaccini, 2013). Equity objectives and constraints 
have already been included in private transportation NDP considering spatial allocation of road improvements, 
highway investment, intergenerational equity, tolls, congestion pricing, and cordon pricing (Meng and Yang, 2002, 
Yang and Zhang, 2002, Antunes et al., 2003, Chen and Yang, 2004, Sumalee et al., 2009, Barbati, 2012). On the 
other hand, often researchers in the field of transit network design do not appear to have explicitly incorporated 
issues of equity and access, predominantly focusing on the minimization of user and operator costs (Kepaptsoglou 
and Karlaftis, 2009). 
Farahani et al. (2013) note that minimizing the total travel time/cost, the most common form of objective function 
in NDP, may lead to unbalanced congestion levels throughout a network and hence some OD pairs may benefit more 
than others in term of travel time reduction. In some case, selected OD may even experience an increase of costs. 
Hence, it is necessary to introduce equity measures in the NDP formulation, to ensure a more equitable distribution 
of benefits. 
Our literature review shows that multimodality has been largely ignored in road and public transit NDP. In 
addition, nearly all NDP are framed in a deterministic way. However, actually, both the data available to the analysts 
and the problem constraints and/or available resources can be affected by uncertainty, and fuzziness (Caggiani and 
Ottomanelli, 2011 and 2014). In this paper we address all these shortcomings, putting forward an NDP formulation 
considering multimodal equity goals in a context of uncertain data/constraints. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Firstly we provide a brief discussion of the concept of equity 
and its implementations in transportation planning. Then multimodal equity indicators are introduced, followed by 
the general formulation of the proposed model. Subsequently, we compare the performance of crisp and fuzzy 
approaches in solving our problem by means of a toy network. We show that the fuzzy approach can be used to 
derive a set of nearly-optimal solutions selected on the basis of Pareto optimality, which should be carefully 
examined by the decision-maker in search of the most appropriate solution. Conclusions and future research 
directions are identified in the last section. 
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2. Equity and Fairness in Transport Planning 
2.1. Concept of equity 
Equity is a complex and multifaceted subject, whose definition is somehow arbitrary. Essentially it is a form of 
distributive justice (Rock et al., 2014). Different people have different concepts of equity, but also, which of the 
aspects of equity that seems important will depend very much on the particular context and circumstances 
(Langmyhr, 1997). In this paper, equity refers to the fairness and appropriateness of the distribution of impacts 
(benefits and costs) (Litman, 2014). What might be considered a fair distribution is, again, a complex issue, and it is 
discussed below in relation to transportation. 
In the decision-making field, equity measures are commonly used to assess the economic and social impacts of 
different development scenarios. Despite the increasing effort to incorporate equity in decision-making models, 
there is little agreement on the best way to assess equity. A large number of measures can be found in literature, but 
few attempts have been made to review and compare such metrics, so as to identify the appropriate measure(s) for 
each type of application. A rare exceptions is the paper Marsh and Shilling (1994) presenting a detailed review of 
equity measures for public facility planning.  
Two general categories of equity can be singled out: horizontal equity and vertical equity (Repetti and McDaniel, 
1992). Horizontal equity (fairness or egalitarianism) concerns the provision of equal resources to individuals or 
groups considered equal in ability. Promoting horizontal equity means to avoid favoring one individual or group 
over another, and so to offer services regardless of needs or actual ability. Vertical equity (social justice, 
environmental justice or social inclusion) applies to the distribution of resources among individuals with different 
abilities and needs. Vertical equity is promoting by supporting groups based on their social class or specific needs in 
order to make up for overall societal inequalities. These different types of equity often overlap or conflict. 
Therefore, transport planning involves tradeoffs between different equity objectives (Litman, 2014).  
2.2. Transit equity 
 “Transportation equity is a civil and human rights priority. Access to affordable and reliable transportation 
widens opportunity and is essential to addressing poverty, unemployment, and other equal opportunity goals such as 
access to good schools and health care services.[...] Providing equal access to transportation means providing all 
individuals with an equal opportunity to succeed” (The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights, 2015).   
The last decades have witnessed a slow but steady paradigm shift towards the consideration of equity and social 
inclusion as an integral part of the transit planning process. The need for systematically incorporating spatial, 
temporal and socioeconomic distributional effects in transport decision-making is discussed in Jones and Lucas, 
2012. Equity and social inclusion have been initially discussed with respect to fare policies, concessionary fares, and 
transit subsidies. Recently the scope of research has been widened to include population groups with mobility 
limitations (Ferguson et al., 2012).  
Also the implementations of the equity concept in public transport planning can be classified in one of the two 
above mentioned perspectives: the horizontal equity framework has been used in the “mass transit” approach, 
aiming at maximizing the number of served users it encapsulates (Currie and Stanley, 2007). In the “social transit” 
perspective, a case of vertical equity, the goal is to provide public transit service to those who need it most,  such as 
people without private transport means or specific low income groups, youth or ethnic minorities (Murray and 
Davis, 2001, Garrett and Taylor, 1999, Deakin, 2007). 
Rising personal incomes, greater availability of cars, lower fuel prices, and substantial public investment in road 
infrastructure have contributed to reduce the demand for public transit. Still, many people without regular access to 
cars depend on public transit. For these “transit dependent” (or “captives”) the continue availability of public mass 
transit is vital to access jobs, education, medical care, and other fundamental services (Garrett and Taylor, 1999). 
Therefore, it is essential to incorporate public transportation in NDP. In the following, we extend the NDP 
formulation to consider the concept of equity applied to public transit in a quantitative way. We adopt a mass transit 
perspective, fostering horizontal equity to ensure the best distribution of the service among users. 
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3. NDP with multimodal equity constraints 
3.1. Multimodal equity constraint specification 
Meng and Yang (2002) define equity considering the OD travel costs generated by the modification of a network. 
In particular, they consider the ratio between the equilibrium travel costs after (ݖ௪ሺ࢞ሻ) and before (ݖҧw) changing the 
network for each OD pair w in the network: 
w
w
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ߙ௪ . If ߙ ൏ ͳ  all users benefit from the network design implementation, if  ߙ ൐ ͳ some users 
experience an increase of travel costs. To improve the equity of the solution, a constraint can be added to the 
traditional NDP formulation, enforcing that the possible equilibrium OD travel cost increases are below a given 
threshold ߙ௠௔௫, set by the decision makers. In other words, ߙ௠௔௫ is the maximum permissible lack of equitability of 
the benefit distribution. 
However, the formulation of Meng and Yang (2002) neglects the level of the demand between the OD pairs. 
Therefore, the use of an equity constraint based on ߙ in Equation (1) may generate solutions with remarkable 
benefits (in terms of individual costs) for OD pairs with low demand and smaller negative consequences for busy 
OD connections. To avoid this problem, let: 
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i.e. the relative variation of OD pair cost brought about by the network modification, weighted by the ratio of the 
demand dw associated to that OD to the total demand.  ߜ௪ is an indicator of the variation of the overall mobility cost. 
We propose to account for the equity issue in the NDP by adding a constraint on the value of  ߜ ൌ 
௪
ߜ௪. 
3.2. Network Design Problem (NDP): general formulation 
NDP is an allocation problem. In the mainstream approach to NDP resources are deployed so as to minimize the 
total system cost under a set of constraints and taking into account the user behavior. 
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where: 
x z is the function of the total cost of the network;  
x x is the vector of the design variables; 
x f * is the vector of equilibrium assignment link flows; 
x P is the path choice probability matrix; 
x C is the vector of path costs; 
x d is the vector of travel demand. 
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Equation (3a) represents the consistency constraints among demand, flows and supply parameters. Equations (3b) 
requires that the set of the design variables and that of the equilibrium flows satisfy external (E) and technical (T) 
constraints such as, respectively and for example, available budget and link flows-capacity ratio.  
Note that this formulation is suitable to Continuous NDP, that is problems in which the decision variables are 
continuous as in the case of road capacity expansion, timing traffic light, and determination of tolls for some specific 
streets. 
Nearly all road NDP (RNDP) studies deal with the improvement of existing networks. In contrast, public transit 
NDP (TNDP) studies mainly deal with the configuration of new transit networks, or the partial reconfiguration of 
the existing networks. A common characteristic of RNDP and TNDP is that they consider only a single mode. In 
reality, as explained above, in general multiple modes coexist and interact with each other. Our formulation is a case 
of  a Multi-Modal Network Design Problem (MMNDP) with two modes (private transport and buses). We note that 
a multimodal problem arises when at least two modes are considered and simulated, even if design decisions are 
related to only one of the modes (Faharani et al., 2013). In our case, within the general formulation of the proposed 
model, the interactions between flows of different modes are neglected: networks of different modes are not related 
to each other, and thus the flows of one mode do not have any effect on the flows of the other mode. Indeed, in our 
car-bus problem, buses move in dedicated lanes, and therefore public transit flows are physically separated from 
private transport ones. Consequently, z (the function of the total cost of the network) is simply the sum of the costs 
of private and public transport. 
4. Comparison of two specifications of NDP with equity constraints 
Here we study two different specifications of the problem in equations (3) to (3b), one based on crisp 
optimization, the other on fuzzy optimization. We illustrate them by an application to the network of Yang and 
Zhang (2002). We compare the performance of the two approaches in terms of equity of the suggested solutions. 
4.1. Case study 
In our test, the supply design variables are signal settings parameters. We adopt a global optimization approach, 
in which we search for the vector of optimal effective green times (x*) for all signalized intersections. These values 
are obtained through the minimization of the network total cost z depending on signal settings (x), on equilibrium 
flows (f*) and on equity constraints. This analysis has been carried out on the test network and data proposed by 
Yang et al. (2001), to which we added a bus rapid transit lane (Fig. 1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Test network 
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The network is made up of 9 nodes (3 origins and 3 destinations), 14 links and 9 O-D pairs. We consider 
signalized intersections at node 5, with three-phases regulation scheme, and at nodes 6 and 8, with two-phases 
regulation scheme. Let ݃௣௛௡ௗthe effective green time for phase ph at node nd. The vector of the design variables is x 
= [ ଵ݃ହǢ ݃ଶହǢ݃ଷହǢ ଵ݃଺Ǣ ݃ଶ଺Ǣ ଵ଼݃Ǣ ݃ଶ଼ሿǤ For all the signalized intersections the effective cycle time is fixed to Ct = 90 
seconds. 
A single public transport line is operated in the network, as shown in Fig. 1. We assume the presence of a bus 
lane along the route. Therefore, in this example we neglect the interaction between flows of different modes. . 
However the formulation presented above is general, and can be applied to fully multimodal situations. The bus 
stops coincide with the nodes traversed by the bus line (1,4,5,6,9). In our test, we do not have accurate data about 
the demand assigned to each bus stop, but we know just how many people globally moving from a given origin to a 
given destination using public transport. We assume a dwell time equal to 10 seconds for all the stops. 
The travel demand d (Table 1) is assigned to the network using a Deterministic User Equilibrium traffic 
assignment model; i.e. we suppose that the network travel times are deterministic and dependent on the congestion 
level, and that all travelers are perfectly aware of the travel times and always able to identify the shortest travel time 
route. Several algorithms are available to calculate the equilibrium link flow with rigid demand; we use the Frank-
Wolfe algorithm (LeBlanc et al., 1975,  Nguyen, 1976). 
 
Table 1. O-D vector
O-D 1-6 1-8 1-9 2-6 2-8 2-9 4-6 4-8 4-9 
L 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
D 120 150 100 130 200 90 80 180 110 
 
We assume that 30% of the demand generated by the OD pairs 1-6 and 1-9 is served by public transport. 
We specify different link cost function for the two modes of transport. For the private transport system, the link 
cost cl is the sum of the link travel time and the waiting time at the signalized intersections. The link travel time tcl, 
function of the link flow fl and of the link capacity cal, is calculated using the well-known BPR link cost function 
(Bureau of Public Roads Traffic Assignment Manual, 1964) (4) where the free flow travel time (tr) and capacity 
(ca) depend on the considered link l.  
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The waiting time is estimated using the Doherty’s delay function (Doherty, 1977) (5): 
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where: 
x tlwa is the waiting time at intersection on link l (s/veh); 
x fl  is the traffic flow on link l (veh/h); 
x s is the saturation flow (veh/h); 
x g is the effective green time; 
x ȝ is the effective green ratio (g/Ct). 
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In the public transport, the link cost values cbus  are the sum of the link travel time, the bus dwell time and the 
waiting time due to the signalized intersections. Travel time tli at every link i can be calculated by (6): 
 
i
i
i
l
v
Lt                                                            i =1,2,…                             (6) 
where Li  is the length of link i, while vi is the bus speed at link i (in our test assumed to be 20 km/s). 
The model of dwell time tldw of buses at a bus stop is represented in (7) (Liu and Sinha, 2007): 
 
Npcct j
j
jodw
l ¦                                                                 j =1,2,…                             (7) 
where cj is the average boarding time of ticket type j passengers, pj the proportion of type j passengers and N the 
total number of passengers waiting for the service. Parameter co is a constant door opening and closing time and an 
observed value of 5 seconds (Clark and Pretty, 1992) was used in the model. In this study, only one ticket type was 
modeled. 
The waiting time tlUD is estimated using the Webster’s Uniform Delay Model (8), on the assumptions of stable 
flow and a simple uniform arrival function: 
 
2
RVt UDl                        (8) 
where R is the duration of red phase, V is the number of vehicles arriving during the time interval given by the 
difference between the instant in which they arrive at the traffic light and when the light has turned green. Length of 
red phase is given as the proportion of the cycle length which is not green. 
4.2. Performed optimizations 
We solve the optimization problems using genetic algorithm (GA) metaheuristic. The analysis entails two steps: 
in the first one we generate 600 starting configurations, i.e. vectors of  design variables; in the second step, we apply 
GA using each of these starting configuration as starting point  of  different runs. Details on the optimization of the 
fuzzy specification are given by Caggiani and Ottomanelli, 2014, who present a fuzzy non-linear programming to 
solve an equilibrium NDP. 
 
Table 2. NDP specification 
 Equity Crisp  
Specification (ECS) 
Equity Fuzzy 
Specification 
(EFS) 
Objective 
Functions 
Satisfaction -(1) max (g1h1 + g2h2 + g3h3) 
Network total cost min z (x, f*) -(1) 
Problem 
Constraints 
Network total cost -(1) z (x(h1), f*)  (1 – h1) 
Car equity  į୉ୌ
ୡୟ୰
  į୫ୟ୶
ୡୟ୰
  į୉୊ୗ
ୡୟ୰
  įl_car + (įu_car – įl_car)·(1-h2) 
Bus equity  į୉ୌ
ୠ୳ୱ
   į୫ୟ୶
ୠ୳ୱ  į୉୊ୗ
ୠ୳ୱ
  įl_bus + (įu_bus – įl_bus)·(1-h3) 
Demand – flows  
Consistency f* = ǻ(x)P(x, C(f*, x))d(C(f*, x)) 
Cycle time consistency ෍݃௣௛
௡ௗ
௣௛
ൌ ܥ௧ ׊ ݊݀ א ሼͷǡ͸ǡͺሽ 
(1)= not applicable in the optimization
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The crisp and fuzzy specifications of the NDP with equity constraints are shown in Table 2. 
The objective in ECS is to minimize the total network costs, sum of the costs of car and public transport users. In  
EFS we maximize the overall satisfaction H, and we add a constraint on the admissible network total cost. The total 
satisfaction H is the weighted sum of three components h1,h2 and h3, concerning total network cost, the equity of the 
solution to private transport users, and the equity to public transport users respectively. The constraint on the total 
network cost requires the solution cost to be smaller than the cost corresponding to starting configuration. Each 
satisfaction index is a measure of how well the solution performs in terms of the related quantity. The weights 
(g1,g2,g3) are introduced to let the decision makers rank the components of the overall satisfaction. They will be 
assumed equal to 1 in the following. The equity constraints of the fuzzy specification account for a certain degree 
with uncertainty in their definition. In the following, įmax and įmin in the ECS are used as the upper and lower bound 
of the fuzzy set of the equity constraints in EFS, but in general they can be different. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     (a)                                           (b) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
     (c)                                           (d) 
Fig. 2. Optimizations results: (a) Private transport costs; (b) Public transport costs; (c) Private transport equity  indicator; (d) Public transport 
equity indicator. 
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Using different starting configuration, each GA run (potentially) generates a different solution. The results of our 
experiments are summarized in Fig. 2 by means of  box plots. In each box, the central mark indicates the median 
value, the edges are the 25th and 75th percentiles, the whiskers extend to the most extreme non-outlier values, and 
outliers are plotted individually. 
Fig. 2(a) and 2(b) show the private and public transport costs respectively. The fuzzy approach seems to work 
better in case of public transport, although the values are more scattered. Fig. 2(c) and 2(d) show the degree of 
equity achieved by the two approaches for car and bus users respectively. The values are comparable for private 
transport, whereas the fuzzy specification gives definitely better results for the public transport service (note that 
lower values of Ɂୠ୳ୱ correspond to more equitable solutions). 
Overall, the test suggests that EFS should be preferred to ECS to promote the use of public transport, because it 
generates more convenient and equitable solutions for bus users. Clearly, this conclusion has to be confirmed by 
applications to larger and more complex networks. In the next section, we analyse the solutions of EFS in greater 
detail, focusing on the three components of the overall satisfaction H used as objective function.  
4.3. Multi criteria decision in EFS 
Our aim is to solve an NDP considering not only the overall network cost but also the equity of the solution for 
each class of users. That means that our allocation problems has several concurrent (and possibly conflicting) goals. 
To solve it, we formulate the EFS as a single objective maximization problem, in which the objective function is the 
sum of the degree at which the solution achieves each of our goals. Note that this presuppose the existence of a 
single network authority, with the power of imposing a design. Metaheuristic methods like GA are not always able 
to identify global maxima and, in general, each run finds a different solution (in our test, we have 600 runs, each 
with a different starting configuration). Therefore, the problem arises of selecting one of the detected local optima as 
solution to the problem. It is not so obvious to choose the solution with the maximum overall satisfaction, since it is 
also possible that the authority is confronted with solutions with similar values of the overall satisfaction, deriving 
from different combinations of satisfaction of the specific goals. In these cases, we propose the analysis of the 
Pareto front of the local optima in the space of the specific satisfactions.  
Pareto optimality is a state of allocation of resources in which it is impossible to make any subject better off 
without making at least one other subject worse off. A Pareto Optimal Solution (POS) dominates non-optimal 
solutions and is non-dominated by other POS. A POS is non-better than another POS in at least one objective (Deb, 
2001). Therefore, any POS may be attractive to the network authority (especially those with high overall 
satisfaction). The network design can be selected by choosing a point on the Pareto front (the geometric locus of 
Pareto optima) according to the authority’s priorities.    
Fig. 3(a), 3(b) and 3(c) give a 2D representation of the Pareto front of satisfaction. Each point in Fig. 3(d) 
represents the solution found by one run of GA (corresponding to a specific starting condition). The coordinates of 
the points are the values of the satisfaction of the three goals in our problem, namely overall cost, equity to car users, 
and equity to public transport users. The Pareto front is made up of the 16 non-dominated solutions in red. The 
coordinates of the 16 points on front are given in Table 3, where solution are listed for decreasing values of overall 
satisfaction. It can be seen that the all the POS have a level of satisfaction of the car equity constraint very close to 
1. This means that it is easy to keep the fairness of the solution as to car drivers in the desired interval ሾɁ୫୧୬ୡୟ୰ ǡ Ɂ୫ୟ୶ୡୟ୰ ሿ; 
indeed, very likely the enhancement of the public transport equity does not affect to a great extent the private 
transport, as in our case study buses move on a rapid transit (separate) lane. 
The satisfaction of the constraint concerning the network cost ranges from 0.5192 to 0.8580, and that of the 
constraint on the public transport equity takes values between 0.4605 and 0.9006. Note that the difference between 
the level of the overall satisfaction of S1 and S2 is very small (less than 0.11%). The two solutions have also the 
same level of satisfaction of the private transport equity constraint, but they clearly differ as to the satisfaction of the 
two other constraints: S1performs better in terms of overall costs but is dominated by S2 as to the public transport 
equity.  
These 16 solution reach the highest level of satisfaction. This is indicative of how the optimization is able to 
improve the status of the corresponding starting configuration, namely how much it manages to reduce the overall 
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costs and increase the achieved levels of equity. Nevertheless, objectively there is no clue about the factual level of 
equity and the actual costs to be incurred. These are displayed in Fig. 3(e), 3(f), 3(g) and 3(h). Costs and equity 
values are normalized in the range between 0 and 1; the lowest overall cost scored at the end of the 600 runs is 
assumed to be the zero, the  uppermost is set equal to 1. Same holds for the private and public transport indicators of 
equity shown on the two other axes. The Pareto front is made up of the 63 non-dominated solutions in red, the ones 
able to achieve the lowest overall costs and the greater level of car and bus equity (the closest to 0). Therefore, a 
network authority concerned with reducing the overall cost should opt for one of these 63 solutions, while taking 
into account the equity components, choosing according to his priorities (private or public transport).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
               
    (a)                                (b)                                (c)                                     (e)                                (f)                                (g)
           
 
                (d)                (h) 
  
 
Fig. 3. Graphical representation of Pareto fronts: (a) 2D - h1 and h2; (b) 2D - h1 and h3; 
(c) 2D - h2 and h3; (d) 3D - h1,h2 and h3; (e) 2D - total costs and car equity; (f) 2D - total costs and bus equity; (g) 2D – car equity and bus 
equity; (h) 3D – car equity, bus equity and total costs.
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Table 3. Optimal Pareto solutions of satisfaction 
Solution number h1 – Total costs h2 – Car equity h3 – Bus equity H= h1+ h2+ h3
S1 0.8107 0.9996 0.7738 2.5841 
S2 0.6811 0.9996 0.9006 2.5813 
S3 0.8742 0.9996 0.7035 2.5773 
S4 0.7143 0.9984 0.8615 2.5741 
S5 0.7256 0.9997 0.8403 2.5656 
S6 0.8118 0.9983 0.7119 2.5219 
S7 0.6496 0.9997 0.8596 2.5089 
S8 0.6062 0.9997 0.8873 2.4932 
S9 0.7363 0.9997 0.7428 2.4787 
S10 0.8280 0.9996 0.5682 2.3958 
S11 0.7527 0.9997 0.6313 2.3837 
S12 0.8462 0.9997 0.5294 2.3753 
S13 0.8580 0.9997 0.5112 2.3689 
S14 0.7041 0.9999 0.6490 2.3530 
S15 0.8800 0.9984 0.4645 2.3428 
S16 0.5192 0.9999 0.6901 2.2092 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we  propose to apply the concept of equity in NDP. Depending on the way in which the concerning 
NDP constraints are formulated, equity may be horizontal and/or vertical, related to private and/or public transport. 
Taking into account not only the overall network costs, but pursuing a fair distribution of the costs among different 
groups of users may increase the acceptability of network designs. 
We present two specifications of the equitable NDP, one formulated as crisp minimization problem (ECS), the 
other as fuzzy maximization problem (EFS). We illustrate the two approaches by an implementation in a network 
already used in the literature. The test reveals that the two methods can lead to different results. In the case we 
analyze, EFS is more favorable to public transport. Of course, this result cannot be considered conclusive but 
requires further confirmation by applications to more complex network. In any case, the fuzzy approach is more 
suitable and theoretically consistent with contexts with approximate and/or uncertain data.  
In EFS, the objective function is a satisfaction index measuring the degree at which the solution overall fulfills 
the three goals we aim to reach in the design problem: lowering network costs without excessively penalizing any 
group of car and bus users. This formulation provides solutions which can be implemented in situations where the 
network is regulated by an authority with a comprehensive responsibility over the transport system. We include 
weights in the problem specification to allow the possibility for the authority to prioritize some goals over the 
others. 
We solve EFS (and ECS) by GA. The application of GA does not guarantee the identification of the global 
optimum and different implementations may identify different local optima. Using the Pareto front, we at first test 
the ability of the optimization to improve the overall satisfaction starting from different initial configurations. All 
the achieved optima show a value of the satisfaction related to car equity really close to 1. Probably allowing cars 
and buses to stay in the same lane  (neglecting the rapid transit bus lane), there would be more interaction between 
the two modes, and enhancements on public transport equity would affect more the private transport. Another 
possibility could be adopting a tolling strategy to have access to certain areas of the transport  network.  
 Secondarily we display the Pareto front related to the final values assumed by costs and equity at the end of each 
optimization run. This would make the decision-making process more transparent, permitting the decision maker to 
identify, among all the optimal solutions, that with the set of goal-specific values which suits best his priorities. 
Our specifications of the equitable NDP should be validated with applications to real world networks, with 
stronger interactions between different modes of transport. Future research may include formulations representing 
situations with competition between actors, for instance between different providers of public transport service. 
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Specifications of constraints considering vertical as well as horizontal aspects of equity would allow designing 
transport networks to respond to the needs of disadvantaged population groups. 
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